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I. INTRODUCTION
The Sherman Act' and the Clayton Act 2 are efforts by Congress
to promote a free and competitive economy and to compensate those
injured by anticompetitive activities. To supplement government
enforcement, section 7 of the Sherman Act 3 provided a means of
1. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1976)).
2. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44
(1976)).
3. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (superseded by Clayton Act, ch. 323,
§ 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914)) (repealed by Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)). Section 7 provided:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or
corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may
sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defen-
dant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
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combating antitrust violations through private treble damage ac-
tions. Section 4 of the Clayton Act,4 which superseded section 7 of
the Sherman Act with only slight modification, provides for treble
damage actions by "any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
"5
The broad language of section 4 apparently provides that any
person with the requisite injury in business or property can bring
suit. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated that courts
should not add requirements to burden private litigants beyond
those specifically set forth by Congress.' Many lower federal courts
have recognized, however, that every antitrust violation creates
"ripples of injury"' felt by enormous numbers of remote parties. The
courts have expressed fear that interpreting section 4 to grant any
party standing to sue would open the floodgates of litigation, result-
ing in an unmanageable number of private actions, far exceeding
those contemplated by Congress." Therefore, the majority of lower
federal courts have limited the scope of section 4 through a judi-
cially imposed "standing" requirement.
As developed by the courts, standing under section 4 incorpo-
rates two distinct components. In addition to showing an antitrust
violation, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the alleged injury occurred
by reason of the antitrust violation (causal component); and (2) that
the alleged injury to business or property was of a type protected
by section 4 (type of injury component).' The federal courts apply
several different tests to determine whether a plaintiff fulfills the
causal component of standing."0 In analyzing the type of injury com-
ponent, courts require corporate or business plaintiffs seeking
4. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States
in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
5. Id.
6. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957).
7. Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 923 (1971).
8. Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292,
1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); see Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From
Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 374, 375-76 (1976).
9. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 129 n.11 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Ragar v. T.J. Raney & Sons, 388 F. Supp. 1184, 1186 (E.D.
Ark. 1975). See generally Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
10. See Part 1H(A) infra.
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standing to prove their injury was of a commercial or competitive
nature. The federal courts are split, however, on the question
whether private consumers have standing to bring suit under section
4. In a trilogy of federal district court cases" considering actions
brought by private consumers" alleging injury as a result of abnor-
mally high prices maintained by antitrust violations, the Northern
District of California denied standing. The Eastern District of New
York, however, has allowed private consumers standing when their
injury in property resulted from payment of an inflated price for a
product as a result of an antitrust violation. 3 The only reported
federal court of appeals decision addressing the issue of private
consumer standing under section 4 is Reiter v. Sonotone Corp." In
Reiter, the Eighth Circuit denied standing to a private consumer,
reasoning that the alleged injury to the plaintiff's pocketbook was
not of a commercial or competitive nature and therefore not an
injury in business or property. 5
In light of the uncertainty regarding private consumer standing
under section 4, this Recent Development will analyze the relevant
legislative history, the case authority, and the policy concerns un-
derlying antitrust law to determine the correct application of stand-
ing to private consumers. This Recent Development suggests that
the denial of standing to private consumers frustrates the purposes
of section 4 and is contrary to the legislative histories of the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts and to existing case authority.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congress enacted the Sherman Act" in 1890 to combat the
trusts and monopolies that grew from the concentrations of eco-
nomic power in the 1880's.Y1 The Clayton Act's was enacted in 1914
to extend the scope of the antitrust laws to areas not covered by the
11. Weinberg v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Gu-
tierrez v. E. & J. Gallo Winery Co., 425 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Smith v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., [1977-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,251 (N.D. Cal. 1977); appeals
docketed, Noes. 77-1724, 77-1725, 77-1845, 77-1850, 77-1851, 77-1852 (9th Cir. 1977).
12. For purposes of this Recent Development, the term "private consumer" refers only
to noncommercial, nongovernmental consumers who did not suffer a commercial or competi-
tive injury in business or property.
13. Theophil v. Sheller-Globe Corp., 446 F. Supp. 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
14. 579 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1978).
15. Id. at 1086-87.
16. See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
17. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1940); M. FORKOSCH,
ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER (ENFORcEMENT) 32 (1956).
18. See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
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Sherman Act.'9 The general purpose of both acts was to prevent
restraints on trade and to encourage free competition." Congress
recognized that the aggregation of unchallenged economic power
was inimical to a vibrant, progressive economy. 2' Section 4 provides
a means of combating violations of the antitrust laws by allowing
private treble damage actions.2 2 The specific purposes of private
treble damage actions under section 4 are "to deter violators and
deprive them of 'the fruits of their illegality,' and 'to compensate
victims of antitrust violations for their injuries.' 23 Private treble
damage actions complement government enforcement by increasing
19. See H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2637, 2639.
20. In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), Chief Justice Stone stated that
the purpose of the Sherman Act was "the prevention of restraints to free competition in
business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or
otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and
services. . . ." Id. at 493. The underlying policy of free competition has been articulated by
the Court.in other forms. See, e.g., United States v. Reading, 253 U.S. 26, 59 (1920) (secure
competition and preclude practices that defeat it); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S.
61, 82 (1912) (preserve free action of competition). In Cleary v. Chalk, 488 F.2d 1315 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), the court stated:
The goal of the Federal antitrust laws is to safeguard the interplay of competitive
forces in the far-flung commerce of the Nation. The Sherman Act. . . "was designed
to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfet-
tered competition as the rule of trade." [Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 4 (1958)]. Its "fundamental purpose. . . was to secure equality of opportunity and
to protect the public against evils commonly incident to destruction of competition
through monopolies and combinations in restraints of trade." [Charles A. Ramsay Co.
v. Associated Billposters, 260 U.S. 501, 512 (1923)]. The Clayton Act . . .had these
wholesome aims no less in view, but sought its contribution to them through a regulatory
technique of its own.
Id. at 1319-20; see Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1957); Maltz v. Sax, 134
F.2d 2 (7th Cir. 1943); H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2637, 2639; FoRKosCH, supra note 17, at 32-41.
21. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). In American
Tobacco Co. the Court stated:
Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initi-
ative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a
narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant
stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone ...
These considerations, which we have suggested only as possible purposes of the Act, we
think the decisions prove to have been in fact its purposes.
Id. at 813 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir.
1945)).
22. Section 7 of the Sherman Act provided an identical means of combating violations
of antitrust laws. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
23. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978); see Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977). The lower courts have also recog-
nized that the purposes of section 4 (section 7) are to "compensate those injured by violations
of the antitrust laws. . .[and] to function as an independent method of enforcing antitrust
policy." Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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the number of enforcing parties.24 To further effectuate the purposes
of the antitrust laws, section 16 25 of the Clayton Act provides for the
availability of private injunctive relief against threatened viola-
tions.
Although the purposes of the acts and of section 4 are clear, the
language of section 4 does not definitely identify the plaintiffs who
have standing to bring suit. The legislative history of the Sherman
Act is inconclusive on the issue of private consumer standing.6 Sim-
ilarly, the legislative history of the Clayton Act does not definitely
indicate whether a private consumer has standing to sue under sec-
24. Numerous courts have noted that private actions are stimulated by the possibility
of lucrative treble damage recoveries. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.
1969), aff'd, 436 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971); Flintkote Co. v.
Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1957); Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2 (7th Cir. 1943).
25. Clayton Act, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), provides in part: "Any person, firm,
corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court
of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage
by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . ." Section 16 provides injunctive relief for "any
person" but does not contain the "business or property" limitation of section 4.
26. The legislative history of the Sherman Act is voluminous yet inconclusive on the
question of standing under section 7. The bill originally introduced by Senator Sherman
authorized in section 2 "[tlhat any person or corporation, injured or damnified by such
arrangement, contract, agreement, trust, or combination, may sue for and recover. . . the
full consideration or sum paid by him for the goods, wares and merchandise. . . ... S. 1, 51st
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1889). Yet section 7 as enacted contained the limitation that a person
must be injured in his business or property. See note 3 supra. In the debate of the bill, Senator
George argued:
The right of action against the persons in the combination is given to the party
damnified. Who is this party injured, when. . . there has been an advance in the price
by the combination? The answer is found in the bill itself in the words, "intended to
advance the cost to the consumer of any such articles." The consumer is the party
"damnified or injured."
I .It is manifest that in nearly every instance the damage by the advanced price
of each article affected by these combinations would be-though in the aggregate large,
indeed-so small as not to justify the expense and trouble of a suit in a distant court.
I do not hesitate to say that few, if any, of such suits will ever be instituted, and
not one will ever be successful.
21 CoNG. Ruc. 1767-68 (1890). In response, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported a revised
bill differing substantially from the original. This bill subsequently became section 7 of the
Sherman Act. Senator George again voiced opposition to the bill because "the poor man, the
consumer, the laborer, the farmer, the mechanic, the country merchant, all that large class
of American citizens who constitute 90 per cent of our population and who are the real
sufferers will have no opportunity of redress. . . ." 21 CONG. Run. 3150 (1890).
Senator Morgan cautioned that the "bill ought not to be a breeder of lawsuits. If there
is any one duty we have got higher than another in respect of the general judiciary of the
United States, it is to suppress litigation and have justice done without litigation as far as
we can." 21 CONG. REc. 3149 (1890). See generally Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977).
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tion 4.7 Thus, while courts generally consider legislative history to
be a valid indicator of congressional intent, the susceptibility of the
legislative histories of the Sherman and Clayton Acts to varying
interpretations28 undermines any attempt to infer accurately con-
gressional intent on the question of private consumer standing
under section 4.
]11. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF STANDING UNDER SECTION 4
Although one commentator has asserted that section 7 of the
Sherman Act (section 4 of the Clayton Act) "is so plain and precise
in all its parts that it requires only to be attentively read in order
to be understood, '2 the federal courts have had difficulty in deter-
mining the standing of various plaintiffs. In Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.3" the Supreme Court
stated that instead of confining its protection to a single class of
plaintiffs, such as purchasers, competitors, sellers, or consumers,
the Sherman Act protects all victims of antitrust violations." The
Court reiterated its broad approach to judicial determination of
standing under section 4 in Radovich v. National Football League.3"
In Radovich the Court stated that courts should not burden private
litigants with judicial requirements beyond those established by
Congress." Some lower federal courts have also indicated that the
27. Representative Taggart emphasized that "[tihe bill is framed for the purpose of
liberating business and not for the purpose of injuring or destroying any business. Its great
purpose is to protect small business from big business . . . ." 51 CONG. REc. 9198 (1914).
House Report No. 1373 gives additional background of section 4:
These concerns [over dangerous social, political, and economic effects that result
when control of an industry is placed in only a few hands], and the belief that democracy
can be preserved only by dispersing and decentralizing economic and financial power,
together with other dismaying records of turn-of-the-century monopolistic excesses that
were unchecked by the Sherman Act, directly led to the enactment of section 7 of the
Clayton Act in 1914. [citing United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-76
(1966)].
Unlike the Sherman Act, Section 7 of the Clayton Act was meant to deal with
potential, probable monopolies-not actual, completed ones. . . .As the preamble to
the original Clayton bill proclaimed, its purpose was "to prohibit certain trade practices
which.. . singly and in themselves are not covered by the Sherman Act. . .and thus
to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies and monopolies in their incipiency and
before consummation."
H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2637, 2639 (citation omitted).
28. See generally Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972); see also 72
COLUM. L. REv. 394, 394, 396 n.15 (1972).
29. A. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAw 61 (1910).
30. 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
31. Id. at 236.
32. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
33. Id. at 454. In Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134
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efficacy of section 4 should not be weakened by narrow judicial
construction. 4
The vast majority of lower federal courts have limited standing,
however, in an attempt to stem the flood of litigants they fear would
engulf the courts if they interpreted broadly the term "any per-
son." These courts have developed two distinct components of
standing under section 4. In addition to showing an antitrust viola-
tion, to have standing a plaintiff must show: (1) that the antitrust
violation caused the alleged injury (causal component); and (2) that
the alleged injury in the plaintiff's business or property was of a type
protected by section 4 (type of injury component).3 Courts have
formulated several tests to determine plaintiffs' standing under the
causal component."
A. Causal Component of Standing
(1) Direct Injury Test
The Third Circuit in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.3" first articu-
lated the "direct injury" test of standing under section 4. In Loeb
the Third Circuit denied standing to a stockholder-creditor of an
injured corporation because the injury he received was indirect,
remote, and consequential. Basically, the direct injury test provides
that the "first party to purchase a product that has been affected
by a violation has standing to sue, and all others. . . are barred."'39
Several courts have adopted the direct injury test by name or by
application."
(1968), the Court refused to impose broad, common law barriers on litigants in private treble
damage suits because of the public purposes served by such suits.
34. See, e.g., Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'd,
436 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971); Flintkote Co. v. LystJord, 246 F.2d
368 (9th Cir. 1957). Contra, Image & Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp.
237 (D. Mass. 1956).
35. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
36. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
37. For a somewhat outdated compilation of tests adopted by each circuit, see In re
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 127 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1045 (1973).
38. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
39. 72 COLUM. L. REv. 394, 400 (1972).
40. See generally Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1977);
Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973);
Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923
(1971); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1963);
United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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(2) Target Area Test
As early as 1945, the Eighth Circuit held that privity was not
vital for standing under section 4.41 Soon afterward, the Ninth Cir-
cuit articulated the "target area" test in Conference of Studio Un-
ions v. Loew's Inc.4 This test does not require direct privity as does
the direct injury test. Instead, the target area test requires only that
a plaintiff have suffered injury as a result of being within a sector
of the economy at which the illegal activity was directed.43 Several
courts have adopted this method of testing the causal component
of standing.4"
(3) Zone of Interest Test
In Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp.45 the Sixth Circuit rejected
both the direct injury test and the target area test,46 holding that
standing under section 4 is governed by the "zone of interest" test
that the Supreme Court articulated in Association of Data Process-
ing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.47 The zone of interest test
has two requirements: (1) the plaintiff must allege that the defen-
dant caused him injury in fact; and (2) the interest to be protected
must be within the zone of interests protected under the statute in
question.4 8 Few courts have utilized the zone of interest test for
purposes of section 4, and at least one commentator has criticized
this test.49
41. Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1945).
42. 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
43. In Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972), Judge Mansfield stated:
[In order to have "standing" to sue for treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act,
a person must be within the "target area" of the alleged antitrust conspiracy, i. e., a
person against whom the conspiracy was aimed, such as a competitor of the persons
sued. Accordingly we have drawn a line excluding those who have suffered economic
damage by virtue of their relationship with "targets" or with participants in an alleged
antitrust conspiracy, rather than by being "targets" themselves.
Id. at 1295.
44. See Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.
1977); Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Western
Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); South
Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 934 (1966); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955); Kemp
Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc. v. Hartford Auto. Dealers' Ass'n, 380 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Conn. 1974).
45. 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
46. The court stated that these tests "demand too much from plaintiffs at the pleading
stage of a case." Id. at 1149.
47. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See also Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151
(6th Cir. 1975).
48. 521 F.2d at 1151.
49. Sherman, supra note 8, at 399. Sherman bases his criticism on the practical and
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(4) Pass-On Doctrine
The Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machi-
nery Corp."° developed the "pass-on" doctrine in a section 4 action
by a commercial lessee of shoe production machinery. The pass-on
doctrine confers standing upon a purchaser who buys a product at
an inflated price that resulted from antitrust violations, even if that
purchaser "passed on" its increased costs to the next purchaser or
final consumer.51 In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,52 however, the Su-
preme Court reviewed the Hanover Shoe doctrine and held that an
indirect purchaser could not use the pass-on doctrine offen-
sively-only direct purchasers from a manufacturer had standing
under section 4.53 Thus, the "pass-on" doctrine as modified by
Illinois Brick closely resembles the direct injury test.
B. Type of Injury Component of Standing
The type of injury giving rise to consumer standing under sec-
tion 4 is an injury in business or property resulting from an antitrust
violation. In determining the type of injury component, most federal
courts refer to the terms "business or property" concurrently,
implying conjunctive use of the terms. 4 A minority of courts have
addressed the grammatical treatment of the terms, interpreting
"business or property" disjunctively with "property" having a wider
scope and a more extensive meaning than "business." 5 In Waldron
v. British Petroleum Co." the court stated that a determination of
"property" required a value judgment by the court as to whether
that which the plaintiff possesses should be legally protected."
Writing for the Supreme Court in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe
theoretical differences that exist between administrative law actions and antitrust actions.
50. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
51. For defensive use of the pass-on doctrine, however, see Philadelphia Housing Auth.
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd per
curiam sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187
(3d Cir. 1971).
52. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
53. Id. at 725-47. Expressed differently, an indirect purchaser cannot use a pass-on
theory to recover unless the defendant could use the pass-on defense in a suit by a direct
purchaser. Such defensive use is not allowed by Hanover Shoe. Id. at 729. The Supreme Court
in Illinois Brick, however, did note certain exceptions indicated in Hanover Shoe that did not
bar the use of a pass-on defense. Indirect purchasers may have standing in those instances.
Id. at 745.
54. See generally Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
55. See, e.g., Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
56. 231 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
57. Id.
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Works v. City of Atlanta," Justice Holmes stated that "[a] person
whose property is diminished by a payment of money wrongfully
induced is injured in his property."5' Therefore, according to Justice
Holmes, a decrease in a person's wealth precipitated by purchase
of a product at a price inflated by antitrust violations constitutes
an injury in property giving rise to standing under section 4.
Federal courts interpret "business" in the ordinary sense, refer-
ring to a commercial or industrial enterprise or establishment." The
proof necessary to show a business injury is substantially greater
than the proof necessary to show a property injury. 1 Although many
decisions have not focused solely on injury in business, these cases
have involved commercial, industrial, or business plaintiffs. Thus
in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 2 the state of Hawaii brought an
action on behalf of its citizens for injury to its general economy
allegedly resulting from payment of higher prices for petroleum
products because of antitrust violations by Standard Oil. The Su-
preme Court held that the terms "business or property" refer to
commercial interests or enterprises. Because Hawaii's alleged injury
did not affect the state in its role as a commercial entity, the Court
denied standing.63
In 1976, in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Hawaii," Congress enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976."1 This Act empowers state attorneys general
to bring parens patriae actions for treble damages on behalf of in-
jured consumers." The history of the Act indicates that the parens
patriae action was added because of congressional recognition that
58. 203 U.S. 390 (1906). Chattanooga Foundry considered a suit by the City of Atlanta
under section 7 of the Sherman Act for injury suffered as a result of higher prices paid for
pipe. Justice Holmes stated that Atlanta was injured in its property, at least, if not in its
business of furnishing water, by paying more than the worth of the pipe. Id. at 396. Arguably,
Atlanta's position as a commercial plaintiff frustrates the use of Chattanooga Foundry as
authority for private consumer standing under section 4.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Image & Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 239
(D. Mass. 1956).
61. See Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
62. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
63. Id. at 262-65. The Court stated that Hawaii would have standing to sue if it were
seeking recovery for injuries suffered in its capacity as a consumer of goods and services:
"Where the injury to the State occurs in its capacity as a consumer in the marketplace,
through a 'payment of money wrongfully induced,' damages are established by the amount
of the overcharge." Id. at 263 n.14 (citation omitted).
64. See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
65. Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383.
66. See H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CoDE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2572, 2578.
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even though private consumers have a cause of action under section
4, for practical reasons of expense and lack of incentive they are not
likely to exercise their right to sue. 7
Lower federal courts generally have applied the Supreme
Court's limitation of the terms "business or property" to interests
of the plaintiff-enterprise in commercial or competitive ventures
beyond the scope of the Court's Hawaii decision." In GAF Corp. v.
Circle Floor Co." the Second Circuit considered a suit under section
4 by GAF claiming that its acquisition by defendant Circle Floor
would reduce competition in defendant's industry. The antitrust
violations would not cause injury to GAF; rather, only Circle Floor's
competitors would suffer injury. In denying plaintiff standing, the
court stated that section 4 provides relief only to those enterprises
that have suffered some diminution of their ability to compete. 70 In
interpreting the standing of corporate, industrial, or business plain-
tiffs, the federal courts have consistently indicated that only those
injured in their competitive positions or in a commercial manner
satisfy the type of injury component of the standing test under
section 4.71
Until recently, no court has expressly addressed the issue of
private consumer standing under section 4. A few courts had inti-
mated, however, that private consumers have standing under sec-
67. The House Report provides:
Under § 4 of the Clayton Act, any person, including any consumer, who can prove he
was injured by price-fixing or any other antitrust violation, has a cause of action. In most
instances, however, an individual law suit by an injured consumer is, as a practical
matter, out of the question. If, for example, a price-fixing conspiracy results in an over-
charge of a dollar on a relatively low priced consumer item, and 50 million such items
are sold, the aggregate impact of the conspiracy upon consumers and the illegal profits
of the price-fixers are not insignificant-at least $50 million. Yet no single consumer
could practically be expected to bring suit. . . .[He will quite obviously have neither
the incentive nor the resources to engage in protracted and extremely costly litigation
to recover his tiny individual stake.
Id. at 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 2575-76.
68. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
69. 463 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 413 U.S. 901 (1973).
70. Id. at 757. The court stated:
The courts, in interpreting § 4 of the Clayton Act and its predecessor, have endeavored
...to promote the policy of competition established by the Sherman and Clayton Acts
by interpreting § 4 as allowing treble damages only to those who have suffered some
diminution of their ability to compete. Whether viewed in terms of "lack of standing"
or the absence of antitrust damages, the courts, in denying recovery to various kinds of
plaintiffs, have sought to confine recovery to those who have been injured by restraints
on competitive forces in the economy.
Id. at 757-58 (emphasis in original).
71. See Ragar v. T.J. Raney & Sons, 388 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (E.D. Ark. 1975).
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tion 4 when they allege injury in property resulting from purchases
of goods at prices maintained at artificial levels by antitrust viola-
tions." In Bosches v. General Motors Corp." a retail purchaser of
an automobile brought an action under section 4. The court ad-
dressed the causal component of standing and held that plaintiff
came within the cost-plus exception to Hanover Shoe.7" In ruling
that plaintiff had standing to sue, the court expressly held that
private consumers met the causal component of the section 4 stand-
ing test. In addition, by allowing plaintiff to maintain suit, the court
implicitly held that private consumers have standing under the type
of injury component, since such a finding was necessary in order to
proceed with adjudication on the merits. In Cleary v. Chalk, 5 the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated that a consumer pur-
chase of an article in a business transaction at a price higher than
the worth of the product injures the consumer in his property. Simi-
larly, the court found that a consumer of a service is injured in his
property by payment of a price higher than the worth of the service
and has standing under section 4.76 Recent federal district court
decisions have split on the specific issue of the standing of a private
consumer alleging injury in property from artificially maintained
prices.7 7 The only published federal court of appeals opinion to ad-
dress this specific issue denied a private consumer standing under
section 4.78
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF PRIVATE CONSUMER STANDING
UNDER SECTION 4
A. Split Among Federal District Courts
In Weinberg v. Federated Department Stores, Inc." a retail
72. See generally In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation [1973-2] Trade Cas.
(CCH) 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973); Bosches v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill.
1973); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 871 (1971); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
73. 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
74. Id. at 598-99.
75. 488 F.2d 1315, 1319 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
76. Id.
77. See Part IV(A) infra. The private consumers contend they are forced to pay artifi-
cially maintained prices for products because of antitrust violations. These higher than nor-
mal prices result in a greater decrease in their wealth than would have occurred had no
antitrust violations been committed. Thus, the plaintiffs claim they are injured in their
property because their wealth is a property interest protected by section 4.
78. Reiter v. Sonotone, 579 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1978). See also Part IV(B) infra.
79. 426 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Those portions of the opinion in Weinberg under
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consumer of women's clothing brought suit under section 4 against
a department store chain, alleging injury in property resulting from
the payment of additional money for clothes as a result of antitrust
violations. The Northern District of California examined the legisla-
tive history and judicial construction of section 4, and also public
policy concerns in seeking to resolve the issue of private consumer
standing. 0 The court concluded that because the purpose of the
antitrust laws is to enhance free competition, the terms "business
or property" are conjunctive and require a competitive or commer-
cial injury in business or property.81 Thus the court held that a
private consumer alleging injury in property from payment of higher
prices established by antitrust violations does not allege an injury
of a competitive or commercial nature and therefore lacks standing
under section 4.12
Subsequent to the California cases denying private consumers
standing under section 4, the Eastern District of New York granted
a retail purchaser of motor homes standing under section 4 in
Theophil v. Sheller-Globe Corp. In Theophil the court questioned
the validity of the Weinberg holding, stating that injury to a private
consumer's pocketbook in the form of higher prices established by
antitrust violations constitutes an injury in property. 4 Reasoning
that antitrust laws were for the benefit of the consumer, the court
emphasized that it would be anomalous to deny private consumers
standing under section 4.1 The court accepted Justice Holmes' defi-
nition of property in Chattanooga Foundry and concluded that a
private consumer forced to pay a higher price for an item as a result
of antitrust violations is injured in his property and has standing to
sue under section 4.
B. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.
In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. a private retail consumer of hearing
aids brought a class action under section 4 against several manufac-
the headings Legislative History, Judicial Construction, Unredressed Injury to Consumers,
and Section 16 Remedies for Consumers are identical to those portions in Gutierrez v. E. &
J. Gallo Winery Co., 425 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1977), and Smith v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc., [1977-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,251 (N.D. Cal. 1977), under the same head-
ings. Thus reference to Weinberg encompasses all three cases.
80. 426 F. Supp. at 882-86.
81. Id. at 885.
82. Id. at 882-85.
83. 446 F. Supp. 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
84. Id. at 135.
85. Id.
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turers of hearing aids.8 Plaintiff contended that the injury to her
pocketbook resulting from the payment of an artificially high price
maintained by antitrust violations87 constituted an injury in her
property.88 Analyzing the legislative history of the Sherman Act, the
Eighth Circuit noted congressional concern with the statute's ina-
bility to aid the private consumer." According to the court, protec-
tion of business was the congressional purpose underlying the Clay-
ton Act. Reviewing judicial construction of the terms "business or
property," the court concluded that the injury in business or prop-
erty must be an injury of a competitive or commercial nature." The
court distinguished Chattanooga Foundry by reasoning that At-
lanta's claim arguably sought recovery for a business injury to the
city. " The court stated that cases92 suggesting that consumers
should be permitted standing were not inconsistent with the court's
interpretation of section 4, and moreover, such cases did not address
the specific consumer standing question presented by the instant
case. 3 The court interpreted the enactment of the Antitrust Im-
provements Act as evidence that private consumers did not have
standing under section 4, despite the fact that some members of
Congress had assumed that ordinary consumers did have standing.'4
According to the court, the Act gave state attorneys general the
power to bring parens patriae actions because private consumers did
not have standing under section 4. The court expressed apprehen-
86. Plaintiff brought the action "on behalf of herself and 'all persons in the United
States or any subpart thereof who directly or indirectly purchased. . . hearing aids [at the
allegedly unlawful prices].'" Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 579 F.2d 1077, 1078 (8th Cir. 1978).
87. The artificially high price was maintained by defendants through activities alleg-
edly violating the antitrust laws. The allegations included combining and conspiring with
competitors (horizontal price fixing) and controlling the sales practices of their dealers, par-
ticularly through the use of resale price maintenance to control their dealers' retail prices
(vertical price maintenance). Id. at 1078.
88. The injury plaintiff claimed in her property consisted of the payment of a higher
price for a hearing aid than she would have paid had there been no antitrust violations by
defendants. Plaintiff argued this extra income was property that was illegally taken from her
as a result of the antitrust violations.
89. Id. at 1080; see note 20 supra.
90. Id. at 1081-84.
91. Id. at 1082.
92. Id. at 1083 n.12. The court referred to Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S.
308 (1978); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta,
203 U.S. 390 (1906); Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1977); and
Cleary v. Chalk, 488 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
93. The court concluded, without any explanation of the basis for its conclusion, that
these cases were not inconsistent with its holding and that the specific issue of consumer
standing was not addressed by these courts. 579 F.2d at 1083 n.12.
94. Id. at 1085.
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sion that allowing private consumers standing would reduce court
efficiency and would have a detrimental impact on the economy
because of the potential flood of litigants. 5 Therefore, the Eighth
Circuit, like the Northern District of California, denied plaintiff
standing to sue on the ground that injury to her pocketbook was not
a competitive or commercial injury in business or property as re-
quired by section 4.
V. ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE CONSUMER STANDING UNDER SECTION 4
The overriding policy goal of the Sherman and Clayton Acts is
to prevent restraints on trade and to protect free competition. An
important method of achieving this general aim of the antitrust law
is the private treble damage action under section 4. Moreover, pri-
vate treble damage actions serve the more specific dual purposes of
deterring violations and compensating the injured party." The posi-
tion taken by the Reiter and Weinberg courts, however, effectively
precludes treble damage actions by private consumers under section
4. Denial of standing to private consumers therefore frustrates the
goal of the antitrust laws in many instances by foreclosing suit by
the party that may be most willing or able to enforce antitrust
violations.
For example, in Reiter defendants allegedly were guilty of hori-
zontal price fixing and resale price maintenance. If these allegations
were true, dealers purchasing the violators' products may not bring
suit for fear of losing their distribution rights. Moreover, if the man-
ufacturer was maintaining minimum resale prices, all retailers may
be profiting from uniformly high prices and consequently would be
disinclined to sue. Furthermore, collusion and other horizontal re-
straints may be advantageous to competitors outside the conspiracy
because they can often undersell the floor prices maintained by the
violators and thereby increase their sales and profits. Finally, com-
petitors who are co-conspirators are unlikely to bring suit because
they enjoy the mutual advantages of the horizontal restraint. Even
if such a conspirator removes himself from the illegal activity and
then sues, the claim may be barred by the in pari delicto doctrine
95. Id. at 1086. The court reasoned that a multitude of suits by private consumers would
lead to the extinction of small firms unable to pay several treble damage judgments. Those
firms able to pay would simply pass the cost of the judgments on to other ultimate consumers.
The court feared a loss in judicial efficiency resulting from the increase in suits if any private
consumer were given standing. Although use of the class action could decrease the number
of suits, the court viewed large class action suits as unsatisfactory.
96. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
97. See note 23 supra.
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or other equitable defense." Although the federal or state govern-
ments can bring actions to enforce the antitrust laws, their limited
resources often preclude prosecution of many small violations. Fur-
thermore, the government may not even be aware of many small
antitrust violations that individual private consumers or consumer
groups might detect. Private consumers also are less susceptible to
business lobbyists who may deter governmental prosecutions.
Aside from the private consumer's insulation from practical
deterrents faced by commercial or governmental plaintiffs, which
makes the private consumer the most appropriate party to sue for
an antitrust violation, the private consumer plaintiff can fulfill the
goal of promoting economic efficiency as well as any other plaintiff
under section 4. Since one of the primary purposes of antitrust
regulation is to enhance allocative efficiency, the important goal is
to identify and correct anticompetitive practices. Consequently, the
peculiar identity of the plaintiff is immaterial. If antitrust violations
exist, the primary purpose of the court should be to correct the
inefficiency rather than artificially to delineate which party has
standing to sue. Because they offer substantial monetary reward,
treble damage actions by private consumers directly encourage free
competition and effectively deter antitrust violations, supplement-
ing the government's more limited enforcement of the antitrust
laws. In addition, the compensatory goal of antitrust regulation is
accomplished most effectively by allowing the private, ultimate
consumer who incurs the injury to bring an action under section 4.
Finally, actions by intermediate levels of business entities lead to
the unjust enrichment of middlemen at the expense of the final
consumer. Suits by business entities that are direct purchasers from
the antitrust violator give the direct purchasers the benefit of any
recovery obtained plus the profit from the product. Most direct
purchasers can pass on any overcharge in their purchase price to the
final consumer and thereby incur minimal, if any, loss of profit.
Thus, allowing private consumer standing promotes the fundamen-
tal goals of antitrust-economic efficiency, deterrence of future vio-
lations, and compensation of the injured party. The importance of
the private consumer in achieving these goals is even more pron-
ounced when he is the only party likely to sue.
Rather than addressing these issues, the decisions in Weinberg
and Reiter are oriented toward the goal of closing the floodgates of
litigation the courts fear will result if private consumers are allowed
standing under section 4.99 To this end, the courts misconstrued the
98. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
99. See text accompanying notes 7-8 & 35 supra.
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legislative histories of the Sherman, Clayton, and Antitrust Im-
provements Acts and misapplied judicial construction of the terms
"business or property" to a factual situation dissimilar to those in
which the terms were originally defined. The legislative history of
the Sherman Act indicates Congress' understanding that although
private consumers had standing under section 4, they would not
have effective redress because of the lack of incentives to sue and
the extreme burden and cost of such litigation.0 "' The enactment of
the Antitrust Improvements Act, which enables a state to bring suit
if its citizens lack the incentives to sue or cannot afford the burden
or cost of litigation,'"' emphasizes congressional recognition that
private consumers lacked effective redress. The legislative history of
the Clayton Act similarly indicates that it was designed not only to
provide relief to businesses but also to provide relief to both the
private consumer and the entrepreneur from monopolistic practices
not covered by the Sherman Act. 1 2
Judicial restriction of the terms "business or property" to the
commercial injury context did not arise in the private consumer
setting. Courts requiring injury in business or property to be of a
commercial or competitive nature developed the requirement for
application to corporate, industrial, or other commercial plain-
tiffs.0 3 In effect, the commercial or competitive injury requirement
describes the type of business injury the court views as compensable
under section 4. Requiring these plaintiffs to prove a commercial or
competitive injury is a means of determining whether they have
incurred an injury that actually affects their position in the compet-
itive environment. Injury inflicted by antitrust violations not affect-
ing the commercial interests of these plaintiffs is not actually injury
in business.104
100. See note 26 supra.
101. See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
102. See note 27 supra. Additionally, Congress provided injunctive relief in section 16
of the Clayton Act. Clayton Act, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976) provides in part: "Any person,
firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief...
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws .... " See note 25
supra and accompanying text.
Section 16 allows "any person" standing, but section 4 is limited to "any person injured
in his business or property." The difference exists because damages are much more detrimen-
tal to a defendant than an injunction would be. A defendant could sustain multiple injunc-
tions on a violation but could not economically sustain several damage judgments for a
violation. Additionally, section 16 provides injunctive relief from threatened loss or damage
whereas treble damage relief requires quantifiable damage rather than merely speculative
assessments.
103. See notes 62-63 & 68-71 supra and accompanying text.
104. Conceivably, plaintiffs could be the target of action by a group of firms. The
collusion of these firms might violate antitrust laws, but if their action did not affect the
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The commercial or competitive injury requirement is inapplica-
ble to private, noncommercial consumers, and use of this test by the
Reiter and Weinberg courts to deny private consumer standing was
inappropriate. The court should apply the plain meaning of section
4, treating "business or property" disjunctively as did Justice
Holmes in Chattanooga Foundry, and giving "property" its custom-
ary meaning. Under this standard, a consumer who pays the "fixed"
price is injured in his property-as the Theophil court properly
concluded. Attempting to reconcile those cases that seemingly sup-
port the plain reading of section 4,105 the Reiter court emphasized
that the earlier cases did not address the issue of private consumer
standing. The court overlooked, however, several cases intimating
that private consumers had standing under section 4106 as well as the
district court opinion in Theophil.
In denying private consumers standing under section 4, the
Weinberg and Reiter courts subrogated the purposes of the antitrust
laws to the purpose of judicial economy. Although court efficiency
is an important consideration, courts should not promote judicial
convenience at the expense of free competition, which is the princi-
pal aim of the antitrust laws. While the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that lower courts should not overburden antitrust plaintiffs
with restrictive judicial constructions,' the Court obviously has not
advocated opening the courts to unmeritorious or spurious claims by
plaintiffs lacking the requisite standing. The Reiter and Weinberg
courts' overcautious concern with spurious claims is unwarranted,
however, since several limitations already exist to stem spurious
actions under section 4.
First, the different tests developed under the causal component
of the standing requirement already restrict the number of private
consumers who may bring actions under section 4. The private con-
sumer plaintiff may not be in direct privity with the defendant, or
may not be in the target area of the defendant's anticompetitive
activity. The pass-on doctrine as modified in Illinois Brick essen-
tially denies a private consumer standing if the private consumer is
not in privity with the violator, except possibly in cases of cost-plus
plaintiff in any conceivable commercial or competitive manner, i.e., loss of sales or higher
costs, then the plaintiff would not have standing under section 4. If the plaintiff brought suit
because the antitrust activities would harm some other firms without affecting the plaintiff,
the plaintiff would be denied standing. See GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 413 U.S. 901 (1973).
105. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 72-76 supra.
107. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
1548 [Vol. 31:1531
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
contracts or situations in which the manufacturer dominates the
retail dealers. Consequently, the private consumer plaintiff already
faces formidable barriers without the imposition of a restrictive
type-of-injury standard. The procedural problems associated with
consumer actions can be mitigated. Parens patriae actions should
be encouraged in cases involving unmanageable class actions. Fi-
nally, courts can use such procedural devices as joinder, inter-
pleader, and consolidation to reduce the multiplicity of suits by
separate private consumers that may arise from the same antitrust
violation. These devices also would allow private consumers to pool
their resources more effectively and would guard against multiple,
repetitive treble damage judgments against a single violator.
VI. CONCLUSION
Private consumers alleging injury to their pocketbooks because
of artificially higher prices generated by antitrust violations are
injured in their property and should be granted standing under
section 4. Denial of standing to private consumers frustrates the
goals of the antitrust laws and in many instances will allow antitrust
violations to go unchecked. Fear of a tidal wave of litigation proba-
bly is unfounded, but even if existent, such a threat could be con-
trolled by existing procedural devices such as interpleader, joinder,
and consolidation. Decisions like those by the Eighth Circuit in
Reiter and the Northern District of California in Weinberg ignore
these safeguards at the expense of viable antitrust enforcement. In
the future, courts addressing the issue of private consumer standing
should emulate the position of the district court in Theophil and
allow private consumers standing under section 4.
DAVID L. O'DANIEL
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